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In this letter, first, we investigate the security of a continuous-variable quantum cryptographic
scheme with a postselection process against individual beam splitting attack. It is shown that the
scheme can be secure in the presence of the transmission loss owing to the postselection. Second,
we provide a loss limit for continuous-variable quantum cryptography using coherent states taking
into account excess Gaussian noise on quadrature distribution. Since the excess noise is reduced by
the loss mechanism, a realistic intercept-resend attack which makes a Gaussian mixture of coherent
states gives a loss limit in the presence of any excess Gaussian noise.
The security of quantum cryptography is degraded by
the presence of realistic experimental imperfections. In
particular the transmission loss limits the performance of
schemes for a long distance transmission [1].
Recently several continuous-variable quantum crypto-
graphic schemes have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Those are sorted into either all-continuous type or hybrid
type [5], the all-continuous scheme distributes a contin-
uous key and the hybrid scheme distributes a discrete
key. A loss limit, in the sense that the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob IAB cannot be greater
than the Shannon information of an Eavesdropper (Eve)
IE , is given for an all-continuous scheme [6] and it is
shown that this limitation can be removed by introduc-
ing a postselection process for a hybrid scheme [7, 8, 9].
The existence of loss limit is an open question.
The reliable security measure for discrete quantum
cryptographic schemes against individual attacks is the
secure key gain G which ensures that IE can be arbitrar-
ily small in the long key limit if G is positive [10, 11]. The
question is how high G can be for a given loss or trans-
mission distance in realistic conditions. The estimations
are given for BB84 protocol [11], entangled photon pro-
tocol [12], and B92 protocol [13]. The estimation of G for
continuous schemes, if possible, is important as a com-
parison with discrete schemes. At least, the framework
[14, 15] can be adapted to hybrid schemes.
For these discrete schemes, the experimental imper-
fections are mostly determined by observed bit error
rate and dark count rate of single photon detectors
[11, 12, 13]. In continuous-variable schemes, the exper-
imental imperfections appear as the change of quadra-
ture distributions. Experimentally, quadrature measure-
ment is performed slightly above the standard quantum
limit and observed quadrature distribution has additional
Gaussian noise upon the minimum uncertainty Gaussian
wavepacket [8]. Thus, the security analysis including ex-
perimental imperfections seems to become qualitatively
different from that of the discrete schemes.
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In our previous work [9] we estimated G of a hybrid
type scheme applying a postselection [8] for a given loss,
provided Eve performs quadrature measurement for the
lost part of the signal. In this case it is shown that G
can be positive if the loss is less than unity by setting a
large postselection threshold.
In this letter, firstly we estimateG of this scheme [8] for
a given loss against individual beam splitting attack [7],
that is, Eve can use a positive operator valued measure
(POVM) on the individual split signal independently. It
is shown that G can be positive by setting a large thresh-
old and there is no loss limit. Secondly we provide two
concrete examples of eavesdropping attack which causes
excess Gaussian noise. The first one is treated as an
extension of individual beam splitting attack and it also
shows no loss limit. The second one is an intercept-resend
attack. It imposes a practical loss limit on every coherent
state scheme.
The protocol we study here is a four state protocol
using phase modulation of weak coherent pulse and bal-
anced homodyne detection applying a postselection pro-
cess [8, 9]. Alice randomly chooses one of the four coher-
ent states |√neimpi/2〉 with the pulse intensity (the mean
photon number per pulse) n > 0, m = 0, 1, 2, 3 and sends
it to Bob. Then Bob randomly measures one of the two
quadratures xˆk with k = 1, 2 and [xˆ1, xˆ2] =
i
2 . After the
transmission of a large number of pulses, Alice transmits
the parity of m to Bob through a classical channel. For
the pulses m−k = ±1, Bob sets a threshold x0(≥ 0) and
constructs his bit sequence by the following decision:
(bit value) =
{
1 if x > x0
0 if x < −x0, (1)
where x is the result of Bob’s measurement. This is a
postselection process and the advantage is that Bob can
obtain arbitrarily small bit error rate by setting a larger
threshold in the absence of obvious eavesdropping [9].
For simplicity, hereafter we set k = 1. This does not
change the results of following discussion.
The lossy channel is modeled by a beam splitter (see
Fig. 1) and the split signal is assumed to be received by
Eve. Bob receives the signal |√ηneimpi/2〉, where η (0 <
2FIG. 1: In a lossy channel, the input coherent state |α〉 is
simply amplitude-damped as |√ηα〉 by the loss 1−η. In beam
splitting attack, Eve replaces the lossy transmission path with
her lossless one and uses a beam splitter (BS) with the reflec-
tivity 1 − η, which corresponds to the original transmission
loss. Then Eve can obtain the lost part of the signal |√1− ηα〉
without causing any further disturbance to Bob’s signal.
η ≤ 1) is the parameter characterizing the loss 1 − η.
If m − k = ±1, the probability that Bob’s quadrature
measurement results x is given by [9]:
Prob(x) =
1
2
(|〈x1|√ηn〉|2 + |〈x1| − √ηn〉|2)
∣∣∣
x1=x
=
1
2
1√
2pi(∆x)2
{
exp
[
− (x−
√
ηn)2
2(∆x)2
]
+ exp
[
− (x+
√
ηn)2
2(∆x)2
]}
, (2)
where 〈x1| denotes the eigenbra of xˆ1 and (∆x)2 = 14
is the quadrature variance of coherent state. Using this
probability, Bob’s Shannon information gain per pulse is
given by [15]:
1
2
∑
|x|>x0
Prob(x)iAB(x, ηn), (3)
where the factor 1/2 is the probability that the basis is
correct, i.e., Bob’s choice of k satisfies m− k = ±1, and
iAB(x, n) = 1 + Prob(
√
n|x) log2 Prob(
√
n|x)
+ Prob(−√n|x) log2 Prob(−
√
n|x) (4)
is the Shannon information gain when x is triggered,
where
Prob(
√
n|x1) = |〈x1|
√
n〉|2
|〈x1|
√
n〉|2 + |〈x1| −
√
n〉|2
=
1
1 + exp
[
− 2
√
nx1
(∆x)2
] (5)
is the conditional probability that the state is |√n〉 when
the measurement results x1.
Now we evaluate the potentially leaked information
to Eve in the sense of Re´nyi [16]. For the individual
attacks, useful forms of Re´nyi information are known
[14, 15, 17]. According to [15], for any binary pure
states signal {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉}, the maximum Re´nyi informa-
tion gain is given by
IRopt = log2
(
2− |〈Ψ+|Ψ−〉|2
)
. (6)
Since Eve can perform her measurement after she
learns the parity of m, the problem is to find the maxi-
mum value of the Re´nyi information using a POVM on
the binary signal {|
√
(1− η)n〉, | −
√
(1− η)n〉}. Thus
substituting |Ψ±〉 = | ±
√
(1− η)n〉 into Eq. (6), we
obtain
IRopt(n, η) = log2
(
2− exp
[
− (1− η)n
(∆x)2
])
. (7)
Using expressions (3) and (7) we obtain the secure key
gain (with ideal error correction) [9, 11]:
G(x0, n, η) =
1
2
∑
|x|>x0
Prob(x)
(
iAB(x, ηn) − IRopt(n, η)
)
=
∑
x>x0
Prob(x)
(
iAB(x, ηn) − IRopt(n, η)
)
,(8)
where in the last expression we have used the properties,
Prob(x) = Prob(−x) and iAB(x, n) = iAB(−x, n). Thus
we will discuss taking x ≥ 0 in what follows.
Since, for given positive n, 0 ≤ IRopt < 1 and iAB
is a monotonically increasing function of x ≥ 0 with
limx→∞ iAB = 1, we can find x˜ which satisfies
iAB(x˜, ηn)− IRopt(n, η) ≥ 0. (9)
3From this inequality and expression (8) with Prob(x) ≥
0, the choice of the threshold x0 ≥ x˜ gives G > 0.
To obtain the maximum gain for a given η, n and x0
should be optimized simultaneously. A result of simulta-
neous optimization is shown in Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2: The secure key gain G is shown for given (a) loss
1−η and (b) distance in the absence of additional noise. The
solid lines denote G against a beam splitting attack where
Eve performs quadrature measurement [9] and dashed lines
denote G against individual beam splitting attack. Both of
threshold x0 and pulse intensity n are optimized to maximize
G. The distance is determined by using the optical fiber loss
coefficient 0.2dB/km for 1.55µm wavelength.
Thus far, we have considered only the amplitude damp-
ing of coherent states as experimental imperfections.
Practically, noisy channel transforms an input coherent
state into a mixture of coherent states. In the experiment
[8], the observed quadrature distributions are Gaussian.
Therefore we consider the channel which makes the Gaus-
sian mixture:
|α〉 → λ
pi
∫
e−λ|β|
2|α+ β〉〈α + β|d2β, λ > 0. (10)
In this case the observed phenomena for Bob is homoge-
neous broadening of the quadrature distributions.
If the observed quadrature distribution is Gaussian,
Bob’s information gain can be calculated by replacing
(∆x)2 with the observed quadrature variance (∆xobs)
2
in Eqs. (2) and (5). However, the estimation of leaked
information is not straightforward. In the beam split-
ting attack, IR is independent of x and thus postselec-
tion is advantageous. In general, Eve’s operation makes
correlation between Bob’s measurement result x and the
state Eve receives. In such case, IR depends on x and
thus the postselection is not necessarily advantageous. In
the next paragraph we provide an extension of individual
beam splitting attack which preserves the postselection
advantage.
FIG. 3: Eve broadens Bob’s observed quadrature variance
(∆xobs)
2 by combining a beam splitter (BS) and a phase-
insensitive amplifier (AMP).
A lower bound of Re´nyi information for a given loss
and Gaussian noise is given by considering the following
attack: Eve performs a beam splitting with the reflec-
tivity 1 − µ and then she operates a phase-insensitive
amplifier [18] with the amplifier gain g ≥ 1 (see Fig. 3).
µ and g are determined by the observed variance and
mean photon number:
(∆xobs)
2 = (2g − 1)(∆x)2, (11)
gµn = ηn. (12)
This implies µ = 2(∆x)
2
(∆xobs)2+(∆x)2
η = ηg and Eve obtains
more intense signal than that from individual beam split-
ting attack. By defining the effective loss 1 − µ, the
leaked information is estimated as the individual beam
splitting attack: IRL (n, η, g) = I
R
opt(n, η/g). In this case,
we can still achieve G > 0 since 0 < IRL < 1 and
iAB → 1 (x → ∞). Therefore transmission distance is
unlimited by this attack.
A distance bound in the presence of excess Gaussian
noise is given by considering the following intercept-
resend attack: Eve performs simultaneous measurement
using a 50:50 beam splitter followed by two homodyne
detectors and resends a coherent state whose amplitude
is
√
2 times larger than the measured value of the si-
multaneous measurement. This operation is equal to
continuous-variable quantum teleportation without EPR
correlation [19]. So we refer it classical teleportation
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FIG. 4: A distance bound is shown as a function of normalized
excess noise δ = (∆xobs)
2
(∆x)2
− 1. Out of the gray region δ ≥ 2η,
secure key distribution is impossible. The distance is deter-
mined by using the optical fiber loss coefficient 0.2dB/km for
1.55µm wavelength.
(CT). The effect of CT is summarized as the expression
(10) with λ = 1:
|α〉 → 1
pi
∫
e−|β|
2|α+ β〉〈α + β|d2β. (13)
The quadrature variance becomes 3 times larger than
(∆x)2 (2 is from simultaneous measurement and 1 is the
variance of the resending coherent state). In each resend-
ing operation, Eve knows the state Bob receives and Bob
has no information advantage, i.e., IAB < IE . This con-
dition is true for any coherent state scheme because CT
is performed for every coherent state equally. Thus co-
herent state schemes are no longer secure if the observed
excess noise is equal to 2(∆x)2 or larger.
If we introduce loss after CT, the total signal transfor-
mation is
|α〉 → 1
piη
∫
e−
|β|2
η |√ηα+ β〉〈√ηα+ β|d2β. (14)
The observed variance is (∆xobs)
2 = (1+2η)(∆x)2. The
point is that the observed excess noise 2η(∆x)2 becomes
arbitrary small for high loss. Therefore there exist loss
limit in the presence of any finite excess noise. By defin-
ing the normalized excess noise δ ≡ (∆xobs)2(∆x)2 − 1, a nec-
essary condition of secure key distribution is given by
δ < 2η (see Fig.4). This limitation is practical since re-
alization of CT is possible within today’s technology.
In conclusion, we have investigated the security of a
continuous-variable quantum cryptographic scheme ap-
plying a postselection against individual beam splitting
attack and an extension of this attack in the presence
of excess Gaussian noise. It is shown that the secure
key gain can be positive by setting a large postselection
threshold and in this sense the transmission distance is
unlimited as long as these attacks are concerned. We
have also found a loss limit by a combination of a realis-
tic intercept-resend attack and the loss mechanism which
reduces excess noise on quadrature distributions. The
limitation is given for every continuous-variable scheme
using coherent states.
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